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Introduction
On August 8, 2013, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed a summary
judgment motion brought by Marvel Characters, Inc . (“Marvel”) in an action against the
estate of comic book character creator and artist, Jack Kirby . 1 The Court found that the
creations of the author at issue fell under the Work for Hire Doctrine, thereby vesting
ownership of the rights to the characters in Marvel and denying the estate the right to
terminate copyright ownership and regain the rights to the characters created by Kirby. 2
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals also recently rendered a similar decision against the
estate of comic book creator and artist Jerome Siegel, dealing with early drawings,
advertisements, and comics of Superman .3 The tests that the Circuit Courts of Appeals
employ in cases involving the work for hire doctrine vary greatly, especially when
termination of copyright transfers are involved, and could result in differing outcomes with
similar, or identical, cases tried in different locales . Discrepancies exist in and within the
circuits as to these types of relationships generally and the tests to define them are not
clearly laid out across the federal courts . The impacts of these court opinions and analyses,
as well as the fact that the test used in this context may be contrary to Supreme Court
precedent, can have a great effect among a wide range of dealings in the entertainment
industry to such an extent that the Supreme Court could take one of these cases (Marvel
Characters, Inc. v. Kirby or Larson v. Warner Bros . Entm’t) into consideration if the
estates were to petition for certiorari .
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The aim of this paper is to discuss the work for hire doctrine, termination rights in
copyright transfers, and why the “Instance and Expense” test employed by the Second
Circuit in Kirby should be reevaluated and changed in order to protect the termination
rights of authors and their families/estates given under the Copyright Act of 1976 . Part I
will present the current statutory framework of the Work for Hire Doctrine in relation to
termination of copyright grants and assignments and existing precedent relating to the
topic . Part II will introduce the Kirby case and discuss the “Instance and Expense” test
applied by the Second Circuit . Part III will consider the Work for Hire Doctrine in other
fields in the Entertainment Industry and Part IV will argue why courts should reevaluate
the tests employed in these circumstances to better protect authors and their families when
they produce creative works of authorship .

Part I – Termination of Transfers and the Work for Hire Doctrine Under
Copyright Law
Rights in creative works of authorship are freely and easily transferrable to other
parties by the original creator of a work .4 “A ‘transfer of copyright ownership’ is an
assignment, mortgage, exclusive license, or any other conveyance, alienation, or
hypothecation of a copyright or of any of the exclusive rights comprised in a copyright,
whether or not it is limited in time or place of effect, but not including a nonexclusive
license .”5 In many instances, especially in the entertainment industry, this type of transfer
may be a prerequisite for the publication or other exploitation of a work .6 Because of the
disparity in bargaining power between creators and publishers, the creators of the
Copyright Act of 1976 (“1976 Act”) included provisions to protect authors by allowing
them to regain the rights in their works that may have been assigned or otherwise
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transferred after the creation of the work because of the bargaining positions of the parties .7
Termination of a copyright grant or assignment allows for a restoration in the author or
his/her estate of the rights originally transferred so that the author or successor in interest
can renegotiate the terms of an additional transfer or to take the copyrighted material
elsewhere to be exploited by another entity .

A. Termination of Copyright Transfers
Sections 203 and 304(c) of the 1976 Act control terminations of transfers of
copyrights .8 The Congress that enacted the current Copyright Act recognized as
justification for a recapture of rights the necessity of “safeguarding authors against
unremunerative transfers … needed because of the unequal bargaining position of authors,
resulting in part from the impossibility of determining a work’s prior value until it has been
exploited.”9
The division of the sections and their application to particular works a re bound by the
date of the grant of transfer in question .10 When the date of grant is on or after January 1,
1978, §203 applies .11 If the transfer occurred before this date, §304(c) governs .12 The key
termination section for discussion in this article will be §304(c), as the grants at issue in
both Kirby and Siegel were originally made prior to 1978 .
The relevant portion of §304 states:
In the case of any copyright subsisting in either its first or renewal
term on January 1, 1978, other than a copyright in a work made for
hire, the exclusive or nonexclusive grant of a transfer or license of the
renewal copyright or any right under it, executed before January 1,
1978, by any of the persons designated by subsection (a)(1)(C) of this
section, otherwise than by will, is subject to termination under the
following conditions:
….
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…(3) Termination of the grant may be effected at any time during a
period of five years beginning at the end of fifty-six years from the
date copyright was originally secured, or beginning on January 1,
1978, whichever is later . (4) The termination shall be effected by
serving an advance notice in writing upon the grantee or the grantee's
successor in title . In the case of a grant executed by a person or
persons other than the author, the notice shall be signed by all of those
entitled to terminate the grant under clause (1) of this subsection, or
by their duly authorized agents . …(A) The notice shall state the
effective date of the termination, which shall fall within the five-year
period specified by clause (3) of this subsection…and the notice shall
be served not less than two or more than ten years before that date . A
copy of the notice shall be recorded in the Copyright Office before the
effective date of termination, as a condition to its taking effect .
(B) The notice shall comply, in form, content, and manner of service,
with requirements that the Register of Copyrights shall prescribe by
regulation . (5) Termination of the grant may be effected
notwithstanding any agreement to the contrary, including an
agreement to make a will or to make any future grant…. In all cases
the reversion of rights is subject to the following
limitations:…(B) The future rights that will revert upon termination
of the grant become vested on the date the notice of termination has
been served as provided by clause (4) of this subsection .…a further
grant, or agreement to make a further grant, of a particular author's
share with respect to any right covered by a terminated grant is valid
only if it is signed by the same number and proportion of the owners,
in whom the right has vested under this clause, as are required to
terminate the grant under clause (2) of this subsection . Such further
grant or agreement is effective with respect to all of the persons in
whom the right it covers has vested under this subclause… (D) A
further grant, or agreement to make a further grant, of any right
covered by a terminated grant is valid only if it is made after the
effective date of the termination . As an exception, however, an
agreement for such a further grant may be made between the author
[or owner of the termination right] and the original grantee or such
grantee's successor in title, after the notice of termination has been
served… (F) Unless and until termination is effected under this
subsection, the grant, if it does not provide otherwise, continues in
effect for the remainder of the extended renewal term .13
In essence, the termination provision provides a five-year window beginning once the 56 th
year of the original grant ends . Notification of this period must be served to the grantee in a
writing signed by the grantor, or the party(ies) of interest (persons or entities that have the
5

reversion rights), between two and ten years before the termination will occur . The notice
must be technically correct in form, substance, and service or it may be found invalid by a
court . A copy of the notice must then be recorded in the Copyright Office before the date
of effect . After this has been completed and the termination window arrives, the
termination is effective and the transfer is no longer in force .
The provisions of sections 203 and 304(c) are, as one may deduce, very difficult to
achieve, as stated by the court in the original Siegel case: “a constant theme throughout this
litigation was that ‘the termination provisions contained in the 1976 Act are among the
most complex and technical ones in the statute . ’”14 They may be easily circumvented by
the grantees of the rights by exploiting technicalities such as incorrect termination dates,
incorrect notice date, technical flaws in the termination notice, inclusion of materials
outside the proper termination period, failure to get proper signature of all parties of
interest on the notice .15 Sometimes a court will recognize the great difficulty of the
termination procedure and overlook deficiencies in a termination notice . In the original
Siegel action, for instance, the court gave the estate of Jerome Siegel a great benefit, stating
that “given the ‘near-Herculean effort and diligence’ that resulted in the preparation of a
‘six-pound, 546-page termination notice,’ the absence of these additional listings fell
within the scope of harmless error, excused by applicable regulations . Accordingly,
termination validly applied to those materials as well .”16 Even in that opinion, however,
other mistakes or deficiencies, such as inclusion of works outside the notice period were
not given such lenience . 17 “By thus rendering the device of termination of transfers subject
to evasion, the unfortunate consequence is that this highly complex addition to the
Copyright Act often fails to afford any real relief to its intended beneficiaries .”18 It is often
6

a great struggle, often involving court action, for an author or his/her estate to validate a
transfer termination and receive a reversion of the copyright of a work .19

B. Works Made for Hire under the Copyright Act
As emphasized in the above statutory provision, terminations of copyright transfers
may only take place if the work is not considered a “work made for hire. ”20 “The current
Act expressly provides that a grant from author to employer of rights in a ‘work made for
hire’ is not subject to the termination provisions regardless of when it is executed .”21
Section101 of the 1976 Act defines a work made for hire as:
(1) a work prepared by an employee within the scope of his or her
employment; or
(2) a work specially ordered or commissioned for use as a
contribution to a collective work, as a part of a motion picture or other
audiovisual work, as a translation, as a supplementary work, as a
compilation, as an instructional text, as a test, as answer material for a
test, or as an atlas, if the parties expressly agree in a written
instrument signed by them that the work shall be considered a work
made for hire .22
If an employee prepares a work within the scope of employment, the work is automatically
deemed a work made for hire . If these conditions do not exist or the work is created by an
independent contractor, the provisions of paragraph (2) apply and the work must fall under
one of the specified categories and the parties must sign an instrument stating the work is
one made for hire in order for it to be deemed one . “The parties to a grant, [however,] may
not agree that a work shall be deemed one made ‘for hire’ in order to avoid the termination
provisions if a ‘for hire’ relationship (within the meaning of Section 101) does n ot, in fact,
exist between them . Such an avoidance device would be contrary to the statutory provision
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that ‘termination of the grant may be effected notwithstanding any agreement to the
contrary.’”23 As we will see, courts do not always interpret this provision consistently.
In the event a particular work is deemed a Work for Hire under the definition in
§101, the employer is deemed to be the author and legal owner of the copyright for such
work, unless some express agreement or writing states otherwise .24 This affects termination
rights because if the work in question is deemed to be a work made for hire, the creator has
no right or ability to regain any rights in the work .25
Because terms used in this section, employee and employment specifically, are
undefined in the 1976 Act, courts over time have produced several different approaches in
order to determine whether a work is one made for hire .26 Two of the most prominent tests
that emerged prior to 1989 were the control test and the agency principles test .27 That year,
the Supreme Court considered the work for hire doctrine as it related to commissioned
works in Community for Creative Non-Violence v . Reid.28

C. CCNV v. Reid
CCNV involved a disputed work of visual art . The dispute centered on who owned
the commissioned sculpture: the artist who created the work or the organization who
contracted with the artist to create the work .29 By examining the statutory language of the
definition provision and the intent of the legislature in creating this section of th e 1976
Act, the Court determined that the principles of agency law should govern whether an artist
is an employee or an independent contractor .30
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According to CCNV, the distinction of whether an artist is an employee or an
independent contractor is vital in determining whether a work is made for hire .31 If a work
is made by an employee, the determination is based on whether the work was made in the
scope of employment; but if it is made by an independent contractor, the work must fall
into one of the categories specified in §101 of the 1976 Act .32 The Court explains the
reason for these distinctions in its consideration of the legislative history of the doctrine in
the 1976 Act:
The interested parties selected these categories because they
concluded that these commissioned works, although not prepared by
employees and thus not covered by the first subsection, nevertheless
should be treated as works for hire because they were ordinarily
prepared ″at the instance, direction, and risk of a publisher or
producer .33
The importance of CCNV is the conclusion that works commissioned by publishers or
producers are not automatically or specifically works made for hire . A court must first
decide whether the relationship between the parties is one of employer-employee or
employer-independent contractor . Only then can it be determined which section of §101
should be applied .34 Most importantly, this Supreme Court decision advances the
proposition that agency principles should guide the analysis in the absence of definitions in
the Copyright Act and that control or the right to control the work should not be solely
determinative of the issue of whether a work is “made for hire . ”35

Part II – Marvel Characters, Inc. v. Kirby and the “Instance and Expense”
Test
At various times throughout his career, Jack Kirby produced drawings and works for
Marvel Comics on a freelance basis .36 Marvel Characters, Inc . v. Kirby centers on certain
works that were produced by Kirby during the period of 1958-1963 .37 In 2009, Kirby’s
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surviving children sent termination notices to Marvel purporting to exercise their
termination rights for these works under §304 of the 1976 Act .38 The children served
“forty-five copyright-termination notices to Marvel Entertainment Inc ., and other
Hollywood studios relating to comic-book characters and stories created by Mr . Kirby,
including [‘The Hulk’] ‘X-Men’ and ‘The Fantastic Four,’ seeking to recapture copyright
in these characters as early as 2014” .39 Following the notice, Marvel sought a declaratory
judgment, which was granted by the lower court, that the works produced by Kirby during
the period in question were works made for hire, meaning Marvel owned the rights to the
characters and works and that the termination notices were invalid .40 The Kirbys appealed
this judgment to the Second Circuit Court of Appeals .41 In Kirby, the Second Circuit
decided that the works made by Jack Kirby under what is called the “Marvel Method”
constitute works made for hire and that therefore Marvel owns the rights to the several
characters and works created by Kirby during his time with Marvel.42

A. Background and the “Marvel Method”
During the period of 1958-1963, Kirby, as a freelance artist, created artwork and
characters, mainly in comic and graphic novel form, that are at issue in this case .43 Kirby
became known throughout his career as one of the greatest comic book artists of his time .44
During the time in question in this case, many of his works were utilized by Marvel for use
in their comic books .45 The methods and conditions under which these works were made is
at the center of the work for hire issue in this case . At that time, artists that drew for
Marvel worked under a system called the "Marvel Method . " The first step was for Stan

10

Lee, writer, editor, and director of Marvel Comics during the relevant period, to meet with
an artist at a “plotting conference”:
Lee would provide the artist with a “brief outline” or “synopsis” of an
issue; sometimes he would "just talk…with the artist" about ideas .
The artist would then “draw it any way they wanted to . ” Then a
writer, such as Lee, would “put in all the dialogue and the
captions .” According to Lee, he “maintain[ed] the ability to edit and
make changes or reject what the other writers or artists had created”.46
There were no formal contracts of employment with many of these artists and there were
also certain aspects typical in traditional employment relationships that were not present in
the “Marvel Method”:
It is undisputed that Kirby was a freelancer, i .e., he was not a formal
employee of Marvel, and not paid a fixed wage or salary . He did not
receive benefits, and was not reimbursed for expenses or overhead in
creating his drawings . He set his own hours and worked from his
home. Marvel, usually in the person of Stan Lee, was free to reject
Kirby's drawings or ask him to redraft them . When Marvel accepted
drawings, it would pay Kirby by check at a per-page rate .47
The relationship between Kirby and Marvel, however, was atypical even of the Marvel
Method .48 Rather than having a set outline for his work, Lee and Kirby had an open, less
formal, relationship within the “method . ”49 Kirby had less oversight than other artists, a
freer hand in creation and the Second Circuit recognized “is it beyond dispute…that Kirby
made many of the creative contributions,” 50 to the works, such as thinking up and
introducing characters, influencing plotting and pitching ideas.51

B. The 2nd Circuit’s analysis
On the issue of the works being created as works made for hire, the Court analyzed
the relationship between Marvel and Kirby through the Instance and Expense test
formulated under case law interpreting the Copyright Act of 1909 (“1909 Act”) .52 This test,
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first used in the Second Circuit in Picture Music, Inc . v. Bourne, Inc.,53 and later in
Playboy Enterprises, Inc . v. Dumas,54 purports to meld both employee and independent
contractor situations in work for hire cases by asserting that ″an independent contractor is
an ’employee’ and a hiring party an ’employer’ for purposes of the [1909 Act] if the work
is made at the hiring party’s ’instance and expense .’”55 This suggests that if a work is made
through the hiring party’s instance and expense, it does not matter whether the creator was
an independent contractor because his relationship is essentially that of an employee . 56

C. “Instance and expense”
The Second Circuit has stated that a work is made at the hiring party’s “instance and
expense” when the employer induces the creation of the work and has the right to direct
and supervise the manner in which the work is carried out .57 “Instance refers to the extent
to which the hiring party provided the impetus for, participated in, or had the power to
supervise the creation of the work . Actual creative contributions or direction strongly
suggest that the work is made at the hiring party’s instance .”58 “The ‘right to direct and
supervise the manner in which the work is carried out,’ moreover, even if not exercised, is
in some circumstances enough to satisfy the "instance" requirement .”59 Expense refers to
the resources the hiring party invests in the creation of the work .
We have, moreover, suggested that the hiring party’s provision of tools,
resources, or overhead may be controlling . In other cases, however, we seem
to have focused mostly on the nature of payment: payment of a ″ sum certain
″ suggests a work-for-hire arrangement; but ″ where the creator of a work
receives royalties as payment, that method of payment generally weighs
against finding a work-for-hire relationship .60
Absent a writing to the contrary, if a court deems the instance and expense test is met, the
work is found to be a work for hire and the employer is deemed the author of the work.61 In
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Kirby, the Court concluded the instance and expense test to be satisfied by Marvel and
therefore the works created during the time frame at issue were works made for hire .62
In Kirby, the court ultimately determined that “Marvel's inducement, right to
supervise, exercise of that right, and creative contribution with respect to Kirby's work
during the relevant time period is more than enough to establish that the works were
created at Marvel's instance,”63 and
Though the record suggests that both parties took on risks with respect to the
works' success—Kirby that he might occasionally not be paid for the labor
and materials for certain pages, and Marvel that the pages it did pay for
might not result in a successful comic book…we think that Marvel's payment
of a flat rate and its contribution of both creative and production value, in
light of the parties' relationship as a whole, is enough to satisfy the expense
requirement .”64
For the instance requirement, the court focused on the closeness of the working
relationship between Kirby and Marvel . Kirby received many assignments through Marvel
throughout these years, more than most other artists, and most of Kirby’s output during this
period was made for Marvel or “with Marvel in mind . ”65 Marvel also played “at least some
creative role with respect to the works .”66 These factors, along with the fact that Marvel
had the right to supervise, compel Kirby to edit, or reject Kirby’s work lead to the court’s
conclusion that the instance element was met by Marvel .
The expense requirement centered on the payment method of Kirby’s output .
Though Kirby was not paid for expenses, materials, overhaul, or office space, the fact that
Kirby was paid a flat rate for pages accepted by Marvel and no royalt ies or other residual
income was made by Kirby, that the expense, or risk of financial loss, was on Marvel .67
Additionally, the court found that since many of Kirby’s works during the time period were

13

created as a part of Marvel’s existing stories and products, the expense spent on those titles
contributed to the expense element .
After establishing that the elements of the instance and expense test were met, the
court denied the evidence the Kirbys presented, “a 1975 assignment executed by Jack
Kirby that purported to transfer interests in certain works to Marvel (but also averred that
all of his work was for hire), which they say suggests the parties' understanding that Marvel
did not already own the rights,” was enough to establish a “writing to the contrary . ”68 The
Kirbys also highlighted language in payments that suggested assignment of rights rather
than work-for-hire status of the works .69 The court determined that this evidence was not
enough to overcome the summary judgment motion and found in favor of Marvel .70

D. Flaws in the analysis
Though the Second Circuit correctly applied the Instance and Expense test in Kirby
based on existing Circuit precedent, there are serious flaws in the Instance and Expense test
itself, as well as the analysis the court undertook in the case . First, the test flies in the face
of Supreme Court precedent . Second, the instance element, which is essentially a control
test, is biased toward publishers and distributors as they essentially have control over most
aspects of the works they produce commercially . Finally, the expense element will almost
always fall on the side of the publisher or distributor because the entities who pay for
creative works rarely offer compensation in a way that would defeat the expense element .
In CCNV, the Supreme Court stated that having a control test in a work for hire
setting defies the purpose and intent of the work for hire provisions of the Copyright Act .71
In that case, the court stated “transforming a commissioned work into a work by an employee on
the basis of the hiring party’s right to control, or actual control of, the work is inconsistent with the
14

language, structure, and legislative his- tory of the work for hire provisions . ”72The instance and

expense test, though it seems to be only partially a control test, is in fact a control test . The
instance element looks at the impetus of the creation of the work, and can be satisfied,
according to the Second Circuit, by showing control, participation in, or right to control the
works in question .73 This is the purest essence of a control test, 74 especially in light of the
fact that “the ‘right to direct and supervise the manner in which the work is carried out,’
moreover, even if not exercised, is in some circumstances enough to satisfy the "instance"
requirement .”75 The expense portion of the test essentially inquires as to the expense
provided by the “hiring” organization and determines whether that is sufficient to suggest a
work for hire arrangement .76 This may be met by either a direct payment, through payment
of a flat fee for the work(s), an indirect payment through provision of materials or simply
by showing that it has assumed the “risk of loss .”77
In CCNV, the Court discussed control tests and found that the language and the
legislative intent prohibited employing such control factors alone in determining whether a
work is one made for hire .78 Under CCNV, if a creator is an employee, the question is
whether the employee was acting within the scope of her employment in creating the work .
Answering this question is executed by examining at general agency principles .79 If the
creator is an independent contractor, the instances under which the work is deemed a work
for hire are limited to the circumstances laid out in §101(2) .80 The instance and expense
test employed in Kirby has a substantial flaw in that it does not comply with Supreme
Court precedent .
Additionally, as applied in Kirby, the instance and expense test is exceedingly
biased in favor of publishers and distributors in the entertainment industry . The instance
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factor examines the “extent to which the hiring party provided the impetus for, participated
in, or had the power to supervise the creation of the work .”81 This element, even if the
impetus for the work does not come from the hiring party, is preferential to the hiring
party, especially in the entertainment industry . Even if publishers and distributors are
willing to decline the ability to have direct participation or supervision in works that they
are producing for the public, most will exercise some right or power of supervision or
modification . Publishers specifically are almost always going to have supervisory and
editing rights over anything they print . It is unlikely that any entity in this type of industry
would forego the opportunity to supervise or control in some way a product that it is
responsible for producing and selling to the public .
The expense element is even more biased in its application because “expense”
covers both direct and indirect funding, so there are a multitude of means to find the
expense element met in any instance that does not show clear independence, a circumstance
under which this test would not be used . It is also unlikely that a publisher or distributor
would pay royalties for a creator who may not be in a position of high bargaining power or
that already has an established career . For those that are in such a place, an entity could
simply provide costs for the creator in the form of materials or space to work and meet the
expense requirement . In the case of Jack Kirby, this may not apply, but in a wider scope,
the payment of a flat rate as an indicator for work for hire status seems to favor the
publishers/distributors in an unfair manner . This was the motivation for the court’s
decision that the expense element was met in Kirby.82 There were several, and indeed more,
factors that suggested that Kirby was a freelance independent contractor, including the fact
that he was not receiving employment benefits, office space, or even payment for materials
16

or overhead in creating works for Marvel .83 The court deemed, however, that the payment
of the flat rate and Marvel’s risk of loss outweighed the other factors in the expense
analysis .84 The way that the expense portion of the instance and expense test was utilized in
Kirby is highly favorable of Marvel . As a result of the system in place in the Second
Circuit, many authors such as Jack Kirby could wrongly have their work classified as a
work made for hire, when it in actuality is not .
Finally, the requirement that a “sufficient” writing to the contrary having to be
provided to overcome the instance and expense test seems to create a paradox for the party
seeking to terminate . Under the language of the Copyright Act, a writing is supposed to be
required in order to show that a work is a work made for hire .85 In the absence, and
possibly even in the presence, of a writing stating that a work or group of works is
specifically made for hire, the statutory language suggests that it is not . The termination
provisions also include language that works against the instance and expense test’s
requirement of a writing to overcome a work being deemed to be “made for hire”:
Moreover, the 1976 Act provided that if the author did not survive to
exercise termination, the interest would be distributed to the author’s
family members as a statutory class . Congress specifically made this
scheme inalienable: “Termination of the grant may be effected
notwithstanding any agreement to the contrary. …” The author’s
statutory successors take the interest despite any assignment or will of
the author divesting them of copyright ownership . This provision
shows Congress’s intent to give the author’s statutory successors,
rather than the author’s assignees or devisees, the benefits of
copyright recapture—including the new property right of an extended
term of protection .86
If the provisions of the act are to be effectively applied as well as the case law, a paradox
arises for the party seeking to overcome a claim that their (or their ancestor’s) work was
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made for hire. If there is no writing and the instance and expense test is deemed met by the
court, the writing that could have vindicated their interests would not be available because
it would not have needed to be made . If the work by an independent contractor is “made for
hire”, there should, statutorily, be a writing . Including the need for a writing to overcome
the instance and expense test, which takes an independent contractor’s work and
misappropriates it in favor of the hiring party, creates an unrealistic and nearly impossible
standard for those seeking to terminate copyright transfers . As we have seen on several
occasions in the instance and expense context, the rights of creators and their successors is
thwarted by this test and its application .

Part III – The Work for Hire Doctrine Throughout the Entertainment
Industry
A. Work for hire and termination rights in other entertainment fields
The termination of copyright transfers and the work for hire doctrine exist in every
category of copyright law, so naturally, they have a substantial effect throughout the
entertainment industry, not simply in the literary or comic space . There are several recent
cases dealing with these issues throughout the entertainment industry, including in the
music space, in literature and in film and television .

B. Scorpio Music S.A. v. Willis
The case of Scorpio Music S .A. v. Willis87 involved termination rights in the music
industry. In the case, the defendant, Willis, was the original lead singer of the Village
People . This case concerns Willis's attempt to terminate his post-1977 grants in 33 musical
18

compositions including the song "YMCA."88 The plaintiff, a music distributing company,
challenged the validity of the 2011 termination notices sent by Willis and sought a
declaratory judgment from the court that the works were made for hire or that Willis alone
could not terminate the transfer because he was a part of a musical group .89 The California
Southern District Court denied both of these claims and granted Willis’ motion to
dismiss.90 The court reasoned that an author of a joint work has full authority to
unilaterally terminate his interest in a copyright transfer, regardless of the other joint
authors.91 The work for hire claim was dismissed by the plaintiff .92

C. Classic Media, Inc . v. Mewborn
Classic Media, Inc . v . Mewborn concerned the character Lassie and related literary works,
as well as the television and movie rights associated with grants made by the children of the
author of the work .93 The assignees of the rights attempted to invalidate a termination notice
based on a second transfer made by the surviving daughter of the author .94 The Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals decided in favor of Merborn, stating that her termination notice was valid and
effective as to the radio, television and motion picture rights in Lassie, invoking the language of
the statute to disregard a 1978 (made before the effective date of the 1976 Copyright Act)
transfer of copyright .95 The court focused on the bargaining power or the parties and
distinguished similar cases, such as Milne v . Steven Slesinger, Inc . ,96 which dealt with the rights of
Winnie the Pooh, to which the court held against the estate of A .A. Milne because of an
additional Post-1978 grant, revoking and replacing the original grant, made by Milne’s son,
Christopher Robin:

Mewborn's predicament is a far cry from Christopher Milne's . Milne had--and knew
that he had--the right to vest copyright in himself at the very time he revoked the
prior grants and leveraged his termination rights to secure the benefits of the
copyrighted works for A .A. Milne's heirs . Mewborn, on the other hand, would not
have the right to serve the advance notice that would vest her rights under §
304(c)(6)(B) until at the very earliest six years later . Thus, unlike Milne, Mewborn
had nothing in hand with which to bargain .97
The Ninth Circuit in Mewborn analyzed the case in light of the legislative intent of the
protection of the interests of author and his heir's rights .
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These two cases show that, though the ability of an artist or author to successfully
terminate a copyright transfer is difficult in and of itself, the addition of the work for hire
elements (especially the instance and expense test) provide an additional and substantial
hurdle to the interests and goals of those seeking to regain rights in works . The work for
hire doctrine is an inhibitory practice that has a detrimental effect and the instance an d
expense test works against the purpose and intent of the termination provisions of the
copyright act .

Part IV – Reevaluating the Work for Hire Doctrine In Relation to
Termination Rights
Because of the extensive impact on the entertainment industry that termination
rights can have, it is very important to examine and reevaluate the terms and standards
which we apply when dealing with terminations of copyright transfers, especially in
relation with the work for hire doctrine . Creating a system that follows Supreme Court
precedent as well as achieving the goals of the legislature in enacting the termination
provisions is paramount to protecting the interests of creators and their families in the
works that the creator produced .

A. A Freer and Easier System
Though the intention and the desire for creating the termination provisions in the
Copyright Act were clear, and have been reiterated in several court opinions, legal articles
and subject matter treatises, in practice, those aims are not always able to be achieved by
those they were intended to protect . Since its inception, courts have observed that these
“intricate provisions oftentimes create unexpected pitfalls that thwart or blunt the effort of
the terminating party to reclaim the full measure of the copyright in a work of
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authorship . ”98 The system in place for termination of copyright transfers is one of rigid
formality and harsh technicality:

Even when the path to termination is theoretically open, innumerable
potholes remain . The termination notice for Tarzan was ruled fatally
deficient in most particulars . Even when “near-Herculean effort and
diligence” went into the preparation of a 546-page termination notice
for Superman, abetted by a seemingly endless litigation budget, the end
result proved decidedly mixed: The termination was recognized as valid in
some respects, but disallowed in numerous others .99
In order to more effectively provide for the rights of authors and their estates, a change in
either the law or the jurisprudence should be made to clarify, simplify, and relax the
termination standards . Suggestions for modifying the law include revising sections 203 and
304 of the Copyright Act in order to make the process cleaner for those seeking to enforce
their rights, creating new or modifying existing regulations coming from the Copyright
office in order to relax the standards from such a rigid template and to allow for mistakes,
or to have the legislature resolve the language in the Copyright Act concerning terms , such
as “employee” and “employment” and applications of these terms in the circumstances
under which they apply. These solutions, of course, contain issues with conception, timing
implementation and are not perfect . A freer and easier system of allowing termination, for
example, may make publishers and distributors wary or even unwilling to make deals with
creators and authors for a while, but in the long run, the termination provisions are a great
aid to authors and their families and should be continued and made available and more
practicable for the rights of creators .
The largest barrier that exists for many of these creators, other than the formality
and technical aspects of the termination process, is the work for hire doctrine and its free
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and biased application in the courts . The need to change this is vital and will likely become
a more prevalent and important issue as more creative works, including music, artwork,
literature and even comics, reach the time for termination notices to be served and enacted.
At this point, there is a danger of courts becoming flooded with claims, actions for
declaratory judgment and other issues involving termination as more works from 1978
onward that could be solved by a change in the law or the courts on this subj ect . This is
further compelling evidence that should Kirby be appealed to the Supreme Court, the Court
should consider taking the case .

B. Freely and more easily terminating transfers of rights moving forward
As we have seen with the Kirby case, as well as other cases such as Milne and
Larson, termination of transfers are often not granted to those seeking them . But is this a
bad practice? Is the idea of allowing authors or their estates to freely and more easily
terminate transfers of rights a beneficial path for creators moving forward? While
arguments can certainly be made against the practice, such as the willingness of producers
and publishers to welcome new artists and authors or the benefits of commercial entities’
distribution powers to disseminate information, in instances where transfers have been
terminated, the outcomes have been beneficial .
In Marvel Characters, Inc . v. Simon,100 a dispute arose between Marvel and Joe
Simon in his creation, with Jack Kirby, of Captain America after termination notices were
sent to Marvel by Simon . In the Simon case, Marvel argued that a settlement agreement
from a previous case involving ownership of Captain America controlled and barred Simon
from attempting to assert his termination right and, alternatively, that the character and the
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series were works made for hire and Simon’s termination notices were invalid .101 The
Second Circuit Court of Appeals decided that although a settlement agreement was present,
the agreement did not touch on the ownership of the character or the works and in any case
did not affect the termination rights that were at the center of the case at hand .102 The court
also reversed the district court’s grant of summary judgment to Marvel concerning the
invalidity of the termination notices under the work for hire doctrine .103 The court stated
that sufficient questions of fact were present pertaining to that issue and that It will be up
to a jury to determine whether Simon was the author of the Works and, therefore, whether
he can exercise § 304(c)'s termination right .104 Though the final outcome of the case was
not published, since this decision, multiple comics, television shows, and motion pictures
have been released featuring Captain America, suggesting that the issues were resolved by
the parties .
Gary Friedrich Enters ., LLC v . Marvel Characters, Inc .105 dealt with a situation
similar to Kirby, as the work for hire issue under the Marvel Method arose in respect to the
character Ghost Rider .106 In its limited discussion over the issue, the Second Circuit again
reversed the lower court’s grant of summary judgment to Marvel .107 Finding issues of
material fact in question over the Marvel Method’s effect on ownership of the Ghost Rider
character and early works, the court remanded the case for trial .108
The differing opinions and outcomes of Kirby, Simon and Friedrich emphasize the
need for courts to formulate a uniform system for determining ownership and rights in this
area of copyright law . The standard for determining which works are made for hire should
follow the CCNV standard and should seek to protect the rights of creators . The test
employed should not be the instance and expense test because, as has been argued here, it
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is an unfair test that does not accurately follow the intent of the legislature in creating the
Copyright Act or the Supreme Court precedent of CCNV .
“The Second Circuit has acknowledged that its jurisprudence concerning the status
of commissioned works under the 1909 Act has created an almost irrebuttable presumption
that any person who paid another to create a copyrightable work was the statutory
'author' under the 'work for hire' doctrine . ”109 The fact that this view is known and tacitly
accepted by courts, not only in the Second Circuit but nation-wide, is a problem that cannot
be allowed to stand unopposed if the rights of copyright creators is, as the legislative
history suggests, of great importance under the Copyright Act . Having the right and the
ability to terminate previous unremunerated transfers was the purpose of Sections 203 and
304(c) . This protection should not be ignored or so easily manipulated .

Conclusion
The legislative history of the termination of transfer provision—
Sections 203 and 304(c)—relates to the confluence of two major
policy changes driving the legislative project: (1) the shift from a dual
term structure for copyrights and (2) the goal of safeguarding authors
and their spouses, children, and grandchildren against unremunerative
transfers and improve their bargaining position .
….
Section 304(c)(5) was drafted for the very purpose of blocking the
efforts of publishers and persons outside the class of statutory
successors from frustrating exercise of this right .110
Especially in light of the way the Entertainment Industry functions and the
remarkable imbalance of bargaining power between creators and exploiters, the test that
courts use to determine whether a particular work is a Work for Hire should be reevaluated
and made uniform throughout the Circuits . The method chosen should not be the “Instance
and Expense” test used in Kirby, as the methods employed by certain entertainment
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entities, such as comic book publishers and distributors, lend themselves to a finding of
instance and especially expense in many cases in an unfair manner . It is possible that even
taking another test into account, the Kirby works may be deemed to be works made for
hire, but the test employed by the second circuit in Kirby considers these relationships in
many cases in a biased manner and flies in the face of Supreme Court precedent . This
paper does not argue that Kirby’s works are not works made for hire, but rather that t he test
that should be employed should be one that conforms closely to the standards set forth in
CCNV and considers traditional agency principles as well as control standards in order to
determine whether a particular work of group of works are Works Made for Hire . Such a
test would help to better serve the aims of the Copyright Act and the interests of authors
and their families through allowing easier ability to terminate grants and transfers of rights
and giving these parties a greater position to renegotiate or exploit their intellectual
property elsewhere.
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